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SUMMARY
Sudan, geographically the largest country
in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war inter-
mittently for 4 decades.  An estimated 2 mil-
lion people have died over the past two de-
cades due to war-related causes and famine,
and millions have been displaced from their
homes.
The relief operation in southern Sudan is
being coordinated by Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS), established in 1989 in response
to the 1988 humanitarian crisis in which over
200,000 people died of starvation.  The OLS,
a consortium of U.N. agencies and three dozen
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
operates in both government and rebel-con-
trolled territories.  
The 21-year civil war has been and con-
tinues to be a major contributing factor to
recurring humanitarian crisis.  There have
been many failed attempts to end the civil war
in southern Sudan, including efforts by Nige-
ria, Kenya, Ethiopia, former President Jimmy
Carter, and the United States.  To that end, the
heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya,
and Uganda formed a mediation committee
under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental
Authority for Development (IGAD) and held
the first formal negotiations in March 1994. 
In July 2002, the Sudan government and
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
signed a peace framework agreement in
Kenya.  In early September, the government of
Sudan walked out of the Machakos talks and
returned under pressure in early October 2002.
On May 26, 2004, the Government of Sudan
and SPLA signed three protocols on Power
Sharing, the Nuba Mountains and Southern
Blue Nile, and on the long disputed Abyei
area.  The signing of these protocols resolved
all outstanding issues between the parties.  On
June 5, 2004, the parties signed “the Nairobi
Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the
Sudan.” On January 9, 2005, the government
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement signed the final peace agreement at
a ceremony held in Nairobi, Kenya.  The
signing of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace
Agreement effectively ended the 21-year old
civil war and triggered a six-year Interim
Period.
Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Darfur
in western Sudan has led to a major humanita-
rian disaster, with an estimated 1.9 million
people displaced and more that 213,000 peo-
ple forced into neighboring Chad.  While there
are no reliable estimates of the number of
people killed as a result of the conflict, some
observers project that up to 300,000 people
have been killed over the past 24 months.  In
July 2004, the House and Senate declared the
atrocities in Darfur genocide, and the Bush
Administration reached the same conclusion
in September 2004.
Relations between the United States and
Sudan are poor in part because of Khartoum’s
human rights violations, its war policy in the
south, and its support for international terror-
ism, although in recent months relations have
improved somewhat.  In November 1997, the
Clinton Administration imposed comprehen-
sive sanctions on the NIF government.  Presi-
dent Bush has renewed the sanctions since he




In early February 2005, Vice President Osman Ali Taha and the leader of the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Dr. John Garang, briefed the United Nations
Security Council at the invitation of the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan.  Taha asked
the Security Council to call on governments to “lift any economic and trade restrictions or
sanctions that obstruct reconstruction, development and investment efforts, and initiate an
active partnership with Sudan.”  He also called for debt forgiveness.  Garang warned that
linking aid to southern Sudan to the resolution of the Darfur problem would put the
Comprehensive peace agreement at risk.  He argued that this position “punishes two victims
of the conflict: southern Sudan and Darfur.  It is also morally wrong, as well as politically
inapt.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In 1956, Sudan became the first independent (from Britain and Egypt) country in sub-
Saharan Africa.  For almost 4 decades, the east African country with a population of 35
million people has been the scene of intermittent conflict.  An estimated two million people
have died over the past two decades from war-related causes and famine in southern Sudan,
and millions more have been displaced.  The Sudanese conflict, Africa’s longest-running
civil war, shows no sign of ending.  The sources of the conflict are deeper and more
complicated than the claims of political leaders and some observers.  Religion is a major
factor because of the Islamic fundamentalist agenda of the current government, dominated
by the mostly Muslim/Arab north.  Southerners, who are Christian and animist, reject the
Islamization of the country and favor a secular arrangement.  Social and economic disparities
are also major contributing factors to the Sudanese conflict.
The abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement in 1983, which ended the first
phase of the civil war in the south, by former President Jaffer Nimeri is considered a major
triggering factor in the current civil war.  Although the National Islamic Front government,
which ousted the democratically elected civilian government in 1989, has pursued the war
in southern Sudan with vigor, previous governments, both civilian and military, had rejected
southern demands for autonomy and equality.  Northern political leaders for decades treated
southerners as second-class citizens and did not see the south as an integral part of the
country.
Southern political leaders argue that under successive civilian and military governments,
political elites in the north have made only superficial attempts to address the grievances of
the south without compromising the north’s dominant economic, political, and social status.
In recent years, most political leaders in the north, now in opposition to the current
government, say that mistakes were made and that they are prepared to correct them. But the
political mood among southerners has sharply shifted in favor of separation from the north.
The current government seems determined to pursue the military option.  Economic
conditions have deteriorated significantly, and millions of southern Sudanese are at risk of
starvation due to a serious humanitarian crisis, partly caused by the government’s decision
to ban United Nations relief flights.
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The Crisis in Darfur: Background
The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged to
challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur.  The Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claim that the government of
Sudan discriminates against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur and has systematically
targeted these ethnic groups since the early 1990s.  The government of Sudan dismisses the
SLA and JEM as terrorists.  The conflict pits  three African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa,
and Massaleit, against nomadic Arab ethnic groups.  Periodic tensions between the largely
African-Muslim ethnic groups and the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced to the 1930s
and most recently surfaced in the 1980s.  Successive governments in Khartoum have long
neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur and have done very little to prevent or contain
attacks by Arab militias against non-Arabs in Darfur.1  Non-Arab groups took up arms
against successive central governments in Khartoum, albeit unsuccessfully.  In the early
1990s, the NIF government, which came to power in 1989, began to arm Arab militias and
attempt to disarm the largely African ethnic groups. 
The conflict in Darfur burgeoned when the government of Sudan and its allied militia
began a campaign of terror against civilians in an effort to crush a rebellion and to punish the
core constituencies of the rebels. At the core of the current conflict is a struggle for control
of political power and resources.  The largely nomadic Arab ethnic groups often venture into
the traditionally farming communities of Darfur for water and grazing, at times triggering
armed conflict between the two groups.  Darfur is home to an estimated 7 million people and
has more than 30 ethnic groups, which fall into two major categories: African and Arab.
Both communities are Muslim, and years of intermarriages have made racial distinctions
impossible.  Fighting over resources is one of several factors that has led to intense infighting
in Darfur over the years.  Many observers believe that the NIF government has systematically
and deliberately pursued a policy of discrimination  and marginalization of the African
communities in Darfur, and has given  support to Arab militias to suppress non-Arabs, whom
it considers a threat to its hold on power.  In 2000, after the ouster of the founder of the NIF,
Hassan al-Turabi, and a split within the Islamist Movement, the government imposed a state
of emergency and used its new authority to crack down on dissidents in Darfur.  By 2002,
a little-known self defense force of a largely Fur-dominated group emerged as the SLA,
challenging government forces in Darfur.
With the NIF regime internally in turmoil and mounting international pressure to end
Sudan’s North-South conflict, the SLA and JEM were able to gain the upper hand in the
initial phase of the conflict against government forces in early 2003, and appeared well
armed and prepared.  The rebels also enjoyed the support of the local population, as well as
officers and soldiers in the Sudanese army.  A significant number of senior officers and
soldiers in the Sudanese armed forces come from Darfur. The SLA reportedly benefitted
from outside support, including from fellow Zaghawa in Chad and financial support from
Darfur businessmen in the Persian Gulf.  The government of Sudan has accused Eritrea and
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of providing support to the SLA.
 In late 2004, another Darfur armed group, the National Movement for Reform and
development (NMRD) emerged.  Initial reports suggested that the NMRD was created by the
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Government of Sudan in order to undermine the SLA and JEM.  In December 2004, the
NMRD and the Government of Sudan signed a ceasefire agreement in Chad and a month
later agreed to cooperate in facilitating the return of refugees from Chad to Darfur.  Regional
officials and Sudanese opposition figures note that the NMRD is being backed by the
Government of Chad and that the rebels wear uniforms and carry arms similar to that of the
Chadian army.
The government of Sudan has accused the founder of the NIF, Hassan al-Turabi, of
having links with JEM.  Some observers say that Turabi, through his supporters, provides
political and financial support to JEM.  In late March 2004, Turabi was arrested along with
a number of senior army officers.  The government claimed that Turabi was behind an
attempted coup, although officials in Khartoum seemed to back away from that claim by
mid-April 2004. In late September 2004, the government of Sudan, once again, accused
supporters of al-Turabi of an attempted coup.  The government arrested more than 30 people,
including military officials. 
The Humanitarian Situation and the U.S. Response
According to United Nations and
U.S. officials, the situation in Darfur is
considered to be one of the worst
current humanitarian and human rights
crises in the world.  Out of a population
of 7 million people, 1.9 million are
internally displaced, over 213,000 have
been forced into exile, and tens of
thousands of civilian have been killed.
Since February 2003, USAID has
provided an estimated $559 million in
humanitarian assistance for Darfur.
USAID has also established a Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) for
Darfur, although the government of
Sudan delayed the deployment of the
team to Darfur for several weeks.
Recently the USAID/DART has expressed concern regarding the government of Sudan’s
plan to forcibly return internally displaced persons to their places of origin.  Meanwhile,
humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, in large part because of continued
government restrictions and violence against civilians by the pro-government militia, the
Janjaweed.  According to USAID, “the Government of Sudan has imposed rigorous
registration requirements that hinder qualified health workers from entering Darfur.  These
regulations are severely affecting relief agencies’ capacity to respond to disease outbreaks
anticipated in the coming weeks.”2  Surveys conducted by NGOs indicate high rates of
malnutrition in many areas in Darfur. 
Humanitarian Situation at a Glance 
! Affected Population: 2.39
million.
! IDPs: 1.9 million.
! Refugees: 213,000.
! Deaths: 70,000 (U.N.)  (As of
September 2004). 
! Other Mortality Estimates:
300,000.
! U.S. Assistance: $559 million
(FY2003-2005) (As of 2/11/05).
! U.S. Assistance: FY2005, $300.6
million (As of 2/11/05).
Source: USAID
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The African Union and the Crisis in Darfur
The African Union (AU) has been slow in responding to the crisis in Darfur. The AU
became actively engaged during the cease-fire negotiation in Chad and subsequently assumed
a central role in monitoring the ceasefire agreement and facilitating political dialogue
between the government of Sudan and SLA/JEM.  In late March 2004, the AU sent a team
led by Ambassador Sam Ibok, Director of the AU’s Peace and Security Department, to
participate in talks in Chad.  In the April Cease-Fire Agreement, the African Union was
tasked to take the lead in the creation of a Cease-Fire Commission.  The Commission’s
mandate consists of “planning, verifying and ensuring the implementation of the rules and
provisions of the cease-fire agreement.”  In addition, the Commission was mandated to
define the routes for the movement of the respective forces, assist with demining operations,
and collect information about cease-fire violations.  The Commission reports to a Joint
Commission composed of the parties to the agreement, Chad, and members of the
international community.  The African Union mission does not have the mandate to protect
civilians; however, the estimated 1400 troops primarily from Rwanda, Nigeria, and Gabon
are tasked to protect the AU cease-fire monitors in Darfur.
The limited mandate of the AU force, logistical and financial troubles of the
organization, and the size of the force have made the AU mission inefficient, according to
many observers.  The deployment of the AU force, albeit small, took more than four months
after the signing of the agreement.  Moreover, even the limited mandate of monitoring of the
cease-fire agreement has not been effective.  The mandate does not have any enforcement
mechanisms  aside from reporting the violations to the Joint Commission.  Since the signing
of the cease-fire agreement and the deployment of the AU mission, there have been many
violations and only a limited number of the violations have been reported to the Joint
Commission.  Moreover, no corrective measures have been taken by the AU to end these
violations. In September, Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that “It is clear that the
ceasefire is not holding in many parts of Darfur. Clashes were reported from 8-12 September
in Sayyah, north of El Fasher, and Government aligned militia attacked the SLA in Abu
Dalek on 7 September.”3 
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who came to power after the 1994 Rwandan
genocide, had stated that his country would respond if called to end genocide in Sudan during
a speech in April 2004 at the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. Rwanda was the first
to deploy troops as part of the AU mission.  Senior Rwandan officials have also asserted that
despite the limited mandate, Rwandan troops would defend civilians, if they are attacked.
Rwanda has not yet followed through on its threat, however, although in late 2004 Rwandan
troops blocked Janjaweed militia intending to attack a civilian village.  Rwandan troops took
up positions to prevent the Janjaweed from their planned attack on the village and refused
the  Janjaweed’s demand to disarm.4  Rwandan government officials argue that it is better
to have a small force present in Darfur than to have nothing at all.  However, Kigali has made
its views clear that the proposed expanded force should have a mandate to protect civilians.
Many members of the African Union do not share the view that a genocide is occurring in
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Darfur and still consider the government of Sudan as the central player in the resolution of
the conflict and protector of civilians, while U.S. and U.N. officials hold the government of
Sudan responsible for the atrocities in Darfur.
In late September 2004, as noted above, the government of Sudan and the AU agreed
to expand the AU mission by over 3500 troops, several weeks after the United Nations
Security Council endorsed an expanded mission for the AU and threatened sanctions if the
government failed to cooperate.  Many observers contend that the proposed increase in the
force protection is not enough since Darfur is the size of France.  Moreover, they argue, the
mandate of the AU force is still not clear.  The government of Sudan has rejected a proposal
to expand the mandate to  include protection of civilians, especially the internally displaced
people (IDP) in camps throughout Darfur.  The government of Sudan has also rejected the
use of the phrase “peacekeeping;” instead the force is likely to retain its current label,
protectors of cease-fire monitors.  Rwanda has reportedly offered to send more troops to
Darfur.  But observers and U.S. officials assert it will take months to deploy additional troops
to Darfur. U.S. officials are concerned that the AU might not be able to fully deploy new
forces until early or mid-2005, given the number of complications that must first be resolved.
Moreover, resources and logistical support to transport the troops have to be secured,
especially with donor governments with the capability to move these troops from their
respective countries to Darfur.
Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement in Darfur
In September 2003, the government of Sudan and the SLA signed a cease-fire
agreement mediated by President Idriss Deby of Chad.  The agreement collapsed in
December 2003.  In early April 2004, the government of Sudan and the SLA/JEM agreed to
a cease-fire and political dialogue to peacefully resolve the conflict. The government of
Sudan agreed to negotiate with the rebels after considerable international pressure.  The
negotiations were conducted under the auspices of President Deby of Chad and assisted by
the African Union.  The United States and other international participants played an
important role in facilitating the negotiations, although the government of Sudan delegation
walked out of the talks in protest when the head of the U.S. delegation began to deliver his
opening remarks. 
 
On April 8, 2004, the parties agreed to observe a cease-fire for a period of 45 days,
renewable automatically if both parties were to agree.  In late May, the parties renewed the
cease-fire agreement.  However, attacks by the pro-government militia  have been verified
by the cease-fire commission established under the April Accord. These violations by the
government of Sudan and the Janjaweed militia have stalled the peace negotiation process.
Leaders from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM) initially refused to participate in talks in July  in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  because the
GOS failed to uphold the core elements of the April Cease-fire agreement.  In late August
2004, the parties resumed negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria. In November 2004, the
Government of Sudan and the Darfur armed factions signed two agreements in Abuja,
Nigeria: Agreement for Enhancing of the Security Situation in Darfur and Agreement on
Humanitarian Situation. Many observers, however, believe that political agreement between
the rebels and the government of Sudan appears unlikely at this juncture. The SLA and JEM
are demanding fundamental changes in the political structure in Khartoum and the
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disarmament of the Janjaweed and the Government of Sudan is unwilling to meet these
demands. 
The April cease-fire agreement (see text box) provided a framework for a negotiated
settlement between GOS and the SLA/JEM, but the agreement has not been fully
implemented. The African Union and the United Nations have documented a series of
violations by the government of Sudan, including bombings of civilian targets and continued
support for the Janjaweed militia by the government of Sudan.  A report by the Secretary
General of the United Nations states that “the United Nations continues to receive reports of
militia activities in all three states of Darfur.  Of particular concern are several militia attacks
on villages in the Yassin area, northeast of Nyala, during the second half of August.”5  The
report notes that “to the extent the militias that carried out these attacks were under the
influence of the government, the wanton destruction of the villages and the killings of a large
number of civilians constitutes a serious breach of the government’s commitments.”
Some observers contend that there
are also serious structural problems in
the negotiating process.  The April
cease-fire agreement accepted the SLA
and JEM as legitimate political actors
and called for a political solution to the
problem facing Darfur.  But  measures
by the Security Council and proposals
by the African Union mediators suggest
that the SLA and JEM would be
cantoned and disarmed in similar
fashion to the disarmament of the
Janjaweed.  Security Council resolution
1556 imposed arms embargo on “non-
government” entities and individuals in
Darfur.  The “non-government” armed
entities in Darfur are the SLA, JEM,
and the Janjaweed.  The embargo
exempts the government of Sudan and
does not provide mechanisms to ensure that the government of Sudan will not continue to
arm and  support the Janjaweed.  Reportedly, the government of Sudan is inducting the
Janjaweed into the Popular Defense Force (PDF), an Arab-dominated irregular force.  United
Nations and African Union reports clearly indicate that the government of Sudan continues
to provide support to the Janjaweed and coordinate attacks against civilians.  In fact, the
leader of the Janjaweed militia, Musa Hilal, recently confirmed that he had been ordered by
government officials to recruit Arab militia for the Darfur campaign. He stated that “the war
in Darfur was not in our hands.  The decision to make war was taken by higher powers in the
state.”  
The current negotiations, observers contend, treat the SLA/JEM in the same fashion as
the Janjaweed.  The SLA and JEM have stated on a number of occasions that the April cease-
Highlights of the Cease-Fire Agreement
(April 8, 2004)
The parties agreed to:
! Find a political solution to the
problem.
! Cease all hostile media
campaigns.
! Accept a 45-day cease-fire
(renewed in May 2004).
! Establ ish  a  Cease-f i re
Commission and a Joint
Commission. 
! Free all political prisoners.
! Control their allies and ensure
compliance with the agreement.




fire agreement is being re-written to accommodate the government of Sudan.  The rebels
argue that if they are forced to surrender or be cantoned in a security zone, the government
of Sudan will have no interest in finding a political solution to the Darfur problem. Thus, a
political settlement appears unlikely in the immediate future, although the rebels’ lack of
experience in negotiations and possible defections could lead to a temporary agreement. 
Moreover, agreements between the United Nations and the government of Sudan have
undermined the April 2004 Cease-fire Agreement and impeded the work of the African
Union Cease-fire Commission.  Article 2 of the April Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire
on the Conflict in Darfur called for both parties to refrain from any military movement and
reconnaissance operations. And Article 4 of the Cease-fire Agreement empowered the
Commission to approve the movements of the forces of the two parties to the Agreement.
But a Joint Communique signed between the government of Sudan and the U.N. (August
2004) permitted the government to deploy a “police force in all IDP areas as well as in areas
susceptible to attacks.”  This situation allowed the government of Sudan to deploy forces
near or in SLA-controlled areas, where there are an estimated 130,000 IDPs. In addition, the
Darfur Plan of Action (August 2004), another agreement between the U.N. and the
government Sudan, authorized the government to secure areas in Darfur within 30 days,
giving the government of Sudan the authority to deploy security forces in the contested areas
without the approval of the AU Commission.  Thus, in December 2004, government troops
attacked SLA positions in South Darfur in violation of the Cease-fire agreement and
occupied the area, further complicating ongoing negotiations.
The IGAD Peace Process: Background
Alarmed by the deepening crisis and multiple failed attempts by outside mediators,
members of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional
organization that promotes cooperation and development, formed a mediation committee
consisting of two organs: a summit committee of heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya
and Uganda, and a standing committee composed of their mediators.  Preliminary talks were
held in November 1993 and January 1994, and formal negotiations began in March and May
of the same year. Presented at the May meeting, the Declaration of Principles (DOP)
included the following provisions: the right of self-determination with national unity as a
high priority, separation of religion and state (secularism), a system of governance based on
multiparty democracy, decentralization through a loose federation or a confederacy, respect
for human rights and a referendum to be held in the south with secession as an option. The
NIF government initially resisted the DOP, particularly self-determination and secularism.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) accepted the DOP and the government
was later persuaded by the mediators to accept the DOP.  
The IGAD peace process began with the view that the Sudan conflict was having
serious repercussions not only in the country but also in the region, and sought to deal with
the root causes of the conflict.  Conditions were ripe for talks since both sides were
exhausted from years of fighting and some members of the IGAD committee were seen by
Khartoum as allies.  In 1994, however, relations between IGAD member Eritrea and Sudan
began to deteriorate largely due to Sudan’s support for an Eritrean opposition group, the
Eritrea Islamic Jihad.  Meanwhile, serious opposition to the DOP began to emerge from the
NIF government.  The most contentious issues were secularism and self-determination,
which the Khartoum government refused to concede.  In July 1994, the polarization of the
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two sides intensified after the Khartoum government appointed a hard-line NIF member to
its delegation.
The Khartoum delegation professed the government’s commitment to Islamic law as
part of a religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Sudan and throughout the
continent, and refused self-determination as a ploy to split the country.  In September of
2002,  Kenya’s President at the time, Daniel T. Arap Moi, convened a meeting of the
committee’s heads of state, Sudan’s President al-Bashir and the leader of SPLA.  The
Khartoum government walked out of these peace talks, rejecting the DOP. Loss of military
ground and intense international pressure forced the government to the negotiating table in
Nairobi in 1997 and formally accepted the DOP.  The return to the IGAD process was, in
part, in recognition of its failed effort to attract other mediators, who might have been more
supportive of NIF positions. 
Further meetings in 1997-1998 sought to narrow  divisions between the two sides with
the government of Sudan formally agreeing to self-determination for the south.  The
government of Sudan also appeared willing to compromise on some other issues.  In May
1998, the parties, despite some progress earlier, disagreed on which territories were
considered part of the south.  The Khartoum delegation defined the south as the three
provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, established at independence in
January 1956.  The SPLM/A argued that Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile and
other areas on the margins of the three core provinces were also part of the south.  There
were also serious disagreements on the duration of the interim period before a referendum
on self determination, and issues relating to interim arrangements were shelved by the
mediators in part to avoid failure.  The question of religion and state remained unresolved.
The United States and the European Union praised Khartoum’s acceptance of self-
determination as a major step forward.  However, some observers saw the agreement on self-
determination as a small step in the right direction after years of stalled efforts.  The most
contentious and difficult issues are yet to be tackled by IGAD mediators, including the
separation of religion from politics and interim arrangements prior to the referendum.  Some
observers believe that it is too soon to judge whether the concession on self-determination
represents a change in Khartoum’s position or a tactical move to buy more time.  A follow-
up meeting between the parties took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early August 1998.
The talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics.  The parties also
disagreed again on the territorial definition of southern Sudan for the purpose of referendum.
In February 2000, the parties met in Nairobi but failed to make progress.  In early June 2001,
former President Moi reconvened the stalled IGAD peace talks in Nairobi.  No progress was
made, according to a press release issued at the conclusion of the talks.  In January 2002,
IGAD mandated former President Moi to merge the IGAD peace process with the Egypt-
Libya Initiative (ELI), a peace initiative launched by the governments of Egypt and Libya in
2000.  A peace summit is expected to take place in mid-June 2002.
The Machakos Negotiations
On July 20, 2002, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,
after five weeks of talks in Machakos, Kenya, signed a Framework Agreement to end the war
in southern Sudan. The Machakos Protocol calls for a six-year transition period and a
referendum on the political future of southern Sudan at the end of the transition period. The
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Agreement establishes an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of a final peace agreement. The Machakos Protocol also
exempts southern Sudan from the Islamic law or Sharia. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and Norway participated as observers in the Machakos IGAD negotiations. 
The Framework Agreement is seen by the mediators and Sudan observers as a major
breakthrough in the long-stalled IGAD peace process.  The government of Sudan had favored
the earlier Draft Agreement, which neglected self determination for the South and down-
played the separation of religion and the state.  The Framework Agreement by contrast gave
both sides something to take back to their constituencies.  The government of Sudan was able
to secure agreement that it can continue its Sharia laws in the North, while the SPLM/A was
able to secure clear agreement on a referendum to determine the political future of southern
Sudan, after a six-year transition period. The SPLM/A made important concessions at
Machakos, paving the way for the Framework Agreement.  The SPLM/A had long insisted
on a short transition period, two to four years.  The government had long insisted on a ten-
year transition period.  The SPLM/A accepted a longer transition period in order to give unity
a chance, according to members of the SPLM/A delegation at the talks.  The SPLM/A also
abandoned its long-standing opposition to Sharia by agreeing to the continuation of Sharia
laws in the North.  The government of Sudan’s acceptance of a referendum at the end of the
transition period was also seen as an important concession.
The second phase of the negotiations in late 2002 proved difficult. There were
significant disagreements on a wide range of issues.  The parties met to discuss the transition
period in mid-August 2002 and agreed to the following agenda: (1) Structure of Government:
Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Human Rights, and Judiciary and the Rule of Law; (2)
Security Arrangements; (3) Modalities for Implementing the Peace Agreement; (4) Regional
and International Guarantee.  The first two weeks were designed for briefings and lectures
by experts on a wide range of issues relating to nation building and conflict resolution.
Shortly after, the parties were given a 51-page report called “Draft Protocol on Power
Sharing Within the Framework of a Broad based Transitional Government of National Unity
Between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM.”  The parties were asked to respond to
the mediators’ draft.
The government of Sudan and the SPLM delegations met in Karen, Kenya, in late
January-early February 2003 to discuss power- and wealth-sharing arrangements for the
Interim Period.  The parties reached agreement in principle on some aspects of power and
wealth sharing but remain far apart on a number of key issues.  In previous talks, the
negotiations were stalled because the parties could not agree on allocation of parliamentary
seats, civil service positions for Southern Sudanese, share of revenues from oil and other
resources, and power-sharing arrangements in the executive.  During the recent talks, the
parties agreed to move away from percentages and agreed on a formula of “equitable” power
and wealth sharing arrangements.  Although there appears to be broad understanding and
agreement about the formula, the prospects for misinterpretations are substantial.  The
mediators appear eager to reach agreements where possible and avoid contentious issues,
leaving unresolved issues for a later date.  The limited success on power and wealth sharing
issues hinges completely on the word “equitable” sharing of power and wealth.  The real
challenge is likely to come when the parties begin to discuss what “equitable” means to each
side.  The SPLM asserts that decades of neglect of and discrimination against  the South
should be compensated by giving Southerners more than what they have been offered in the
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past.  The government of Sudan argues that other Sudanese communities also deserve
attention.
Recent Developments
On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement signed the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement at a ceremony in Nairobi,
Kenya. More than a dozen heads of state from Africa attended the signing ceremony.
Secretary of State Colin Powell led the U.S. delegation where he urged the parties to  end the
conflict in Darfur.  The signing of this agreement effectively ended the 21-year old civil war
and triggered a six-year Interim Period.  At the end of the Interim Period, southerners will
hold a referendum to decide their political future.  National, regional, and local elections are
expected to take place during the second half of the Interim Period.  
On November 19, 2004, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement (SPLM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Nairobi, Kenya,
pledging to finalize a peace agreement by December 31, 2004.  The agreement was signed
at a special United Nations Security Council meeting in Nairobi, Kenya.  The Security
Council also passed a resolution urging the parties to implement a peace accord without
delay.  The Council “reiterated its readiness, upon the signing of a comprehensive peace
agreement, to consider establishing a United Nations peace support operation.”
In September 2004, the Bush Administration declared the atrocities in Darfur genocide.
In a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Powell
stated that “genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and
the Janjaweed bear responsibility — and that genocide may still be occurring.”  Meanwhile,
the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1564, threatening sanctions against
the Government of Sudan (see below for more on 1564).  
In late June 2004, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Sudan to assess
humanitarian and human rights conditions in Darfur, Sudan. Annan was scheduled to visit
three internally displaced persons (IDP) camps to make a first-hand assessment of the
situation in Darfur.  While at the Zam Zam camp in Northern Darfur, Annan was informed
of  human rights abuses committed by the Janjaweed, including rape, murder, and destruction
of African-Muslim villages.  At the  Meshtel camp, Annan  found the camp empty.  He was
later informed that the IDPs were forcefully removed to another. 
On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions
declaring the atrocities in Darfur genocide.  H.Con.Res. 467 called on the Bush
Administration to “continue to lead an international effort to prevent genocide in Darfur,
Sudan.”  S.Con.Res. 133 called on the Administration to “impose targeted means, including
visa bans and the freezing of assets, against officials and other individuals of the Government
of Sudan, as well as Janjaweed militia commanders, who are responsible for war crimes and
crimes against humanity in Darfur, Sudan.”
Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union expressed “grave concern at the
continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, western Sudan, where the lives of hundreds of
thousands civilians, who live in desperate conditions and require immediate life-saving
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relief, are at great risk.”  The U.S.-EU declaration strongly condemned human rights
violations in Darfur. 
In late June 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Sudan to assess human rights
and humanitarian conditions in Darfur.  Powell is the highest U.S. official to visit Sudan in
over two decades.  In Khartoum, the capital, Powell stated that the international community
“need[s] to see action promptly because people are dying and the death rate is going to go
up significantly over the next several months.”  United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan was also expected to visit Sudan to assess humanitarian conditions in Darfur.
A high-level U.S. delegation visited Khartoum in mid-February to discuss the IGAD-led
peace process.  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Charlie Snyder, met with
senior Sudanese officials to encourage them to bring an end the two-year old peace process
as soon as possible.  The delegation also discussed the humanitarian situation in Darfur and
called on the government of Sudan to provide access to relief organizations  to deliver much-
needed humanitarian assistance.  U.S. Agency for International Development’s Assistant
Administrator, Roger Winter, visited Darfur and met with traditional and religious leaders.
According to press reports, some of the people who met Mr. Winter were later arrested by
security forces in Darfur.
In December 2003, President Bush called President Bashir of Sudan and Dr. John
Garang of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to encourage them to conclude
a just peace agreement and end the 20-year civil war.  In mid-December, Vice President
Osman Taha and Dr. Garang reportedly reached an agreement on wealth sharing.  The parties
agreed to split oil revenues equally during the Interim Period.  Meanwhile, in late November
2003, the SPLA sent a high-level delegation to Khartoum, the capital, for the first time since
the current conflict began in 1983.  The delegation was warmly received by both southerners
and northern students. 
The Humanitarian Crisis (South Sudan)
The current humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan is considered one of the worst in
decades.  According to the World Food Program (WFP), southern Sudanese “are facing
serious food and water shortages due to the combined disruptions of civil war and drought.”
(World Food Program website, [http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/index.asp?region=2].)
According to WFP, more than 2.9 million people in the south of the country are “severely
affected” by the civil war, and an estimated 800,000 people are affected by drought in the
north. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which is the U.N.-coordinated relief effort, was
established in 1989 in response to the death of 250,000 people due to starvation in southern
Sudan.  The OLS is a consortium of U.N. agencies and more than 40 non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that provides emergency relief for civilians living in drought and war-
affected areas. 
The 21-year civil war, drought, and raids by government-backed militias and rebel
groups have disrupted the distribution of food aid and obstructed assessments of need in
severely affected areas.  The crisis has escalated dramatically in recent years.  The scorched-
earth techniques used by pro-government militias have decimated fields and homes and
forced tens of thousands of  people to flee the war-torn areas. Many relief centers and
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hunger-stricken areas are inaccessible by ground transportation because roads were
destroyed, did not exist or are impassible due to rain and mud. In February 2002, government
helicopter gunships bombed Bieh in Western Upper Nile, while civilians were lined up at a
food distribution center.  Seventeen people were killed and many more injured.
U.S. Response. The United States contributed more that $93.7 million in
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year (FY)2000, $154.7 million in FY2001, $139.7 million
in FY2002, and $162.9 million in FY2003.  Moreover, the United States is providing
development aid in opposition-controlled areas to build the capacity of civil administration,
conflict resolution, and assist indigenous non-governmental organizations. In 2002, the Bush
Administration announced two major development programs for southern Sudan and
significantly increased the development budget.  According to USAID, the Southern Sudan
Agricultural Revitalization Project provides $22.5 million for a five year program to improve
agricultural production.  The Sudan Basic Education Program is a five-year $20 million
program designed to improve access to quality education.  In FY2004, the United States
provided $170 million in humanitarian and development assistance. In FY2005, Sudan
(southern Sudan) is expected to receive and estimated $200.9 million.  For FY2006, the
Administration has requested $112 million.  In addition, the Administration has requested
$242.4 million for Darfur and $100 million for southern Sudan in the FY2005 Supplemental
Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other activities.  On March 7, 2005, the House
Appropriations Committee approved the full requested amount for Darfur and $37 million
for southern Sudan.
Sudan and Terrorism
Sudan is considered a rogue state by the United States because of its support of
international terrorism, although in recent years it has taken some measures to improve its
record.  The State Department’s 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report said that Sudan
“has stepped up its counter terrorism cooperation with various U.S. agencies, and Sudanese
authorities have investigated and apprehended extremists suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities.”  According to the same report, “Sudan, however, remained a designated
state sponsor of terrorism.  A number of international terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda,
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’ al-Islmaiyya, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and HAMAS continued to use Sudan as safe haven, primarily for conducting logistics and
other support activities.” Counter-terrorism cooperation began in mid-2000, but the
government of Sudan did not offer significant assistance until after the September 11 terrorist
attacks.  In November 2001, President Bush renewed U.S. bilateral sanctions on Sudan and
the State Department kept Sudan on the terrorism list.
The United States placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism in August
1993 after an exhaustive interagency review and congressional pressure. Sudan has  been a
safe haven for major terrorist figures.  A particularly noteworthy example is Osama bin
Laden.  He used Sudan as a base of operations until mid-1996 when he returned to
Afghanistan, where he had previously been a major financier of Arab volunteers in the war
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  The government of Sudan claims that it
expelled bin Laden from Sudan due to pressures from the Middle East and the United States.
In August 1996, the State Department said that bin Laden was “one of the most significant
financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world today.”
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On May 18, 2004, the State Department removed the government of Sudan from a list
of countries considered “noncooperative” in the war against terrorism.  State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher stated that “Sudan has taken a number of steps in cooperation
against terrorism over the past few years.” Secretary of State Colin Powell later declared that
the U.S. will not normalize relations with the government of Sudan until the Darfur situation
is addressed.
Sudan:  Religious Persecution 
Sudan has been designated a Country of Particular Concern for severe violation of
religious freedom since 1999. According to the 2004 International Religious Freedom
Report, the Government “continues to place many restrictions on non-Muslims, non-Arab
Muslims, and Muslims from tribes or sects not affiliated with the ruling party.” The report
notes that there was “no significant change in practice concerning the status of respect for
religious freedom during the period covered” by the report and states that relations among
religious groups have improved, although restrictions and discrimination against non-
Muslims remain unchanged. 
The government of Sudan views itself as the protector of Islam and considers Islam as
state religion.  The regime is closely identified with Islamic extremist groups, including
Hamas and Hezbollah.  Political opponents are viewed as anti-Islam and religion has been
a key factor in the 20-year civil war that has pitted the largely Christian South against the
Muslim-dominated North. Of the estimated Sudanese population of more than 35 million,
Sunni Muslims comprise 70%; while the remaining 30% are Christians and animists. The
National Islamic Front (NIF) government’s practice of ‘holy war’ is reflected in attacks on
civilians in the South. Some attackers are wooed in part by the tradition that during a jihad
they can keep their booty. The result reportedly has been widespread institutionalized slavery
and massive dislocation. The 2004 International Religious Freedom Report stated that “while
non-Muslims may convert to Islam, the law makes apostasy punishable by death.” Previous
reports have singled out the government of Sudan as a major abuser of religious rights.  In
recent years, the United States has intensified its dialogue with the government of Sudan to
help bring an end to the conflict and to encourage religious freedom and respect for human
rights.  The government of Sudan has taken important measures to end slave raids, provide
access for humanitarian assistance, and improve human rights conditions in southern Sudan.
The government of Sudan, nonetheless, strictly enforces harsh shari’a measures against
Christians in the North, despite repeated claims by government officials that Christians are
exempted from shari’a laws.
The United States and Sudan
Relations between the United States and Sudan continue to deteriorate because of
Khartoum’s human rights violations, its war policy in the south, and its support for
international terrorism.  In 1967, Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the United States
because of American support for Israel in the Arab-Israel war. Relations were restored after
several months. In 1973, the U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission were
assassinated in Khartoum by members of the Black September group, who were tried and
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sentenced to life imprisonment in Sudan.  Relations were further strained when Sudanese
President Nimeri commuted the sentences of the assassins.  In response, Washington recalled
its new ambassador.
In the mid-1970s, in the face of Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa and the fall of
Ethiopia into the Soviet sphere of influence, relations with the Nimeri regime began to
improve.  Nimeri’s support during Operation Moses, in which an estimated 7,000 Ethiopian
Jews were airlifted to Israel through Sudan, further strengthened U.S.-Sudanese relations, but
later contributed to the ouster of Nimeri from power.  Relations became strained once again
when the democratically elected government of Sadiq el-Mahdi was ousted in a military coup
in 1989. Since the military takeover, human rights abuses by the military junta have become
a major source of tension between the two countries. The war in the south has also been a
thorny issue in U.S.-Sudanese relations.  
Another issue in U.S.-Sudanese relations is Sudan’s role in support of international
terrorism. Some Members of Congress have been instrumental in pushing a tougher Sudan
policy and played a key role in the decision to put Sudan on the list of states that sponsor
terrorism and to appoint a special envoy for Sudan. The State Department rejected
congressional calls for a special envoy in December 1993. The Department argued that a U.S.
special envoy would undermine regional and former President Carter’s peace efforts. In a
December 6, 1993, letter to Members of Congress, the Administration said the appointment
of a special envoy “would send the erroneous impression that the U.S. is becoming directly
involved, since Khartoum has made it clear that it rejects a role by the U.S. in the peace
process.”  However, persistent pressure by some Members of Congress led to a reversal of
State’s position in early 1994, at the insistence of the National Security Council (NSC) at the
White House.  The Clinton Administration appointed former Representative Harry Johnston
in late 1999.  The Bush Administration appointed former Senator John Danforth in
September 2001.
The Bush Administration and Current Policy Debate
In late 2000, Washington defeated efforts to lift United Nations sanctions on Sudan and
prevented Sudan from becoming Africa’s representative in the United Nations Security
Council.  Senior U.S. officials met with Sudanese government officials in 2000 to inform
Sudanese officials what it would take to improve relations.  U.S. security officials also spent
several months in Khartoum talking with Sudanese security officials on terrorism.  President
Bush has mentioned Sudan twice in his speeches in the last two months, condemning human
rights violations by the Bashir government. In early March 2001, Secretary of State Colin
Powell told members of the House International Relations Committee that Sudan is a priority
to him and the Administration.
Advocates of a tough U.S. policy towards the NIF government seem prominent in the
policy debate and appear to have the sympathy of senior Administration officials and
Members of Congress from both parties.  In mid-2001,  senior congressional leaders joined
Sudan advocates in condemning the government of Sudan and at a press conference on
Capitol Hill, Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX), Representative Charles Rangel (D-
NY), and the NAACP announced the formation of a bipartisan Sudan Caucus.  Advocates
of a tough Sudan policy favor additional sanctions, appointment of a high-profile Special
Envoy, and active U.S. engagement in peace efforts.  They oppose the staffing of the U.S.
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embassy in Sudan and some favor support for opposition forces.  These advocates would like
the United States government to take specific measures to address slavery and aerial
bombardment of civilian targets. Some who favor a policy of engagement argue that the
policy of containment and isolation has failed to produce tangible results and that the United
States itself is now isolated.  
A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that the
United States should focus on ending the war and engage the government of Sudan in
dialogue.6  The report argues that “in the past two years, Sudan’s rising oil production has
shifted the balance of military power in the government’s favor at the same time that
significant internal rifts have surfaced in Khartoum.”  The report contends that “in this fluid
context, the United States possesses significant leverage.  Among the major powers, it is the
lone holdout in renewing a dialogue with Khartoum.”  The authors of the report support the
full staffing of the U.S. embassy, a U.S.-supported peace process, and a “One Sudan, Two
Systems” formula to preserve the unity of the country.  The CSIS report drew fire from
Sudan activists and has triggered a sharp debate on U.S. policy toward Sudan.
108th Congress Legislation
P.L. 108-497 (S. 2781).  Calls for comprehensive peace in Sudan, authorizes $300
million for humanitarian and development purposes, and proposes sanctions.  Introduced
September 9, 2004; passed September 23 with amendments by unanimous consent. Signed
into law December 23, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 402(Tancredo).  Calls for an investigation of Sudanese officials involved
in international terrorism. Introduced March 30, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 403 (Wolf).  Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human
rights in Darfur State.  Introduced April 1, 2004; passed House May 17, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 467 (Payne).  Declares the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan as
genocide.  Introduced June 24, 2004; passed House July 22, 2004.
H.R. 5061 (Tancredo).  Imposes sanctions on the government of Sudan, authorizes
$450 million for humanitarian and development purposes, and exempts opposition-controlled
areas from current sanctions. Introduced September 9, 2004; passed, amended, October 7.
H.Res. 194 (Capuano).  Called for an end to slavery and human rights abuses in Sudan.
Introduced April 10, 2003.  Passed House July 16, 2003.
S. 2705 (Biden).  Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights




S. 2720 (Lugar).  Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights
in Darfur.  Authorizes $300 million, including $200 for Darfur.  Introduced July 22, 2004.
S.Con.Res. 133 (Brownback).  Declares genocide in Darfur, Sudan.  Introduced and
passed Senate July 22, 2004.
S.Con.Res. 137 (Frist).  Urges the United Nations to suspend Sudan from the United
Nations Human Rights Commission. Introduced September 15, 2004; passed same day.
Passed House September 22.
LEGISLATION
S. 495 (Corzine).   Urges the United Nations to impose sanctions.  Introduced March
2, 2005.
